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ABSTRACT 
Today the potential exists for a terrorist organization to use a Radiological 
Dispersion Device or a dirty bomb within the United States. The results of such an 
attack could be catastrophic to the affected population. The response by law 
enforcement must be calculated and planned. 
To properly analyze the law enforcement's role in a radioactive incident a 
qualitative approach was taken. A determination must be made prior to an attack to 
discern what kind of training will be necessary, what equipment will be required, and 
what response procedures need to be in place to ensure a safe and efficient 
response. 
Law enforcement must understand that the essential components of any 
radiation response protocol are to analyze the situation, secure the area, notify the 
required agencies and protect the general population. Training and equipment needs 
must be fulfilled. Law enforcement must always keep in mind a radiological attack is 
a crime, and proper police procedure must be established to ensure the security of 
the crime scene and preservation of evidence. Research shows that local law 
enforcement agencies must have a usable radiation response protocol which can be 
used in the event of a radiological release. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
With the development of terrorism as a major problem in modern society, law 
enforcement has had to adapt to a rapidly changing environment. They now not 
only have to train to handle the normal daily activities of police duties but also have 
to be prepared to handle a wide variety of other threats. These new threats are 
based upon the belief that terrorists will use any tool at their disposal to conduct an 
attack upon the United States. 
One of the most disconcerting types of attacks is the use of a radiological 
dispersion device or dirty bomb. This device would release radioactive particles into a 
particular environment. 
Local law enforcement is tasked with many roles during such an attack, 
especially in those critical first stages. With that in mind, they must be prepared to 
respond to an attack. The following questions must be answered to gauge what role 
law enforcement must play and if they are ready to do so. 
• What are the complexities of a radiological attack? 
• What are the tasks they will be required to perform? 
• What are the specialized training and equipment requirements for a law 
enforcement response? 
• What role will law enforcement assume during the response and recovery 
phase? 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
• Develop an understanding of radiological preparedness and planning so local 
law enforcement can gauge their preparedness level. 
• Ascertain the level of knowledge that should be expected from local law 
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enforcement in regard to a radiological attack. 
• Assess the needs and wants of local law enforcement for preparation and 
training. 
• Identify what type of information is needed on radiological response operations 
for local law enforcement. 
• Assess if the federal government can provide adequate support to local Jaw 
enforcement for preparedness and response. 
• Determine the areas of assistance needed from the federal government in the 
following areas: education, training, crisis management, incident command. 
• See what the needs are for radiological equipment such as radiological survey 
instruments, monitors and personal protective clothing and equipment. 
With law enforcement having such an immediate and critical role, it is 
imperative that they understand the many components and complexities of 
radiological response operations (FEMA 1990). 
Although the federal government has a host of specialized teams and assets 
that would be brought to bear in the aftermath of such an attack, most of these 
assets would not arrive for several hours, and in some cases, several days (DOE 
2007). Until locally based federal agencies such as the FBI arrive on scene, the 
beginning stages of the response to a radiological attack would be the responsibility 
of the Incident Commander, along with state emergency response agencies, local 
police and fire agencies. 
The federal government has the primary responsibility for preparing all levels of 
government for a response to a radiological weapon's attack. While local and state 
governments are undoubtedly responsible for preparing their respective jurisdictions 
for a radiological attack and all other forms of disasters, it is the federal government 
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that has been given the mandate by Congress to assist communities with 
preparedness and response (HSPD-5 & HSPD-8). 
OVERVIEW 
For decades there have been the dire predictions from the federal government, 
academia, and private research institutions about the threat posed by radiological 
terrorism. The federal government has made progress in organizing and creating 
agencies to handle such an event. Toward this end, the Department of Homeland 
Security's National Response Framework provides a template for the federal 
government's response to such an incident. This of course does not govern law 
enforcement at the local level as there are limited guidelines on what a local law 
enforcement agency should do in the event of attack (NRF 2007). 
Based on current law enforcement doctrine, law enforcement officers will serve 
primarily in a defensive posture. They will be tasked with missions such as reducing 
or preventing the loss of life and, destruction of private property, maintaining order, 
and providing a myriad of other support services during this time. 
In the fall of 1999, the Hart-Rudman Commission finished a year-long 
assessment of the gravest near and long-term threats to American national security. 
At the very top of this list was nuclear/radiological terrorism (USCNS 1999). Given 
the profusion of readily obtainable radioactive "loose sources" throughout the world 
and stockpiles of poorly controlled fissionable nuclear materials located in failing 
nation-states, there is little question why the national security experts convened 
under Hart-Rudman rated nuclear terrorism as our country's most significant threat 
(Ferguson and Potter 2004). 
Since the findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission the "World at Risk" study 
found that of biological agents are now the top threat faced by the United States. But 
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the report does reaffirm the significance of the threat of the radiological attack 
(World at Risk 2008). 
A radiological terrorism attack would likely come in one of two forms of ionizing 
radiation weapons. The first method would be as a rudimentary as a conventional 
explosive "salted" with quantities of a radioactive isotope. This type of weapon is 
referred to as a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or dirty bomb. The second 
would be the detonation of nuclear munitions. 
The explosive results of an RDD attack would be less severe than a nuclear 
detonation, but the results could be just as catastrophic. The RDD will cause death 
and long-lasting injuries, create panic, fear, and contaminate the environment for 
the long term causing substantial direct and indirect economic loss (CSIS 2000). 
To protect the nation from an attack The National Strategy for Homeland 
Security states it is to guide, organize, and unify homeland security efforts. The 
strategy has the following four goals: 
• Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. 
• Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure and key resources. 
• Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur. 
• Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success. 
(Homeland Security Strategy 2007) 
With that in mind, emergency responders must prepare for the contingency 
that such prevention efforts may fail; that terrorists may indeed detonate one of 
these weapons in an American city. If such an attack were to occur, one category of 
first responder would be at the thrust into the middle of the incident response - the 
local law enforcement officer. This is the person who is already deployed in the field 
and who will be on duty no matter when or where an attack would take place. 
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If a dirty bomb is detonated in the United States, it is the emergency responder 
who will be the first on scene; in many cases that will be the local police officer or 
firefighter. He or she will have to quickly analyze the situation (size up) and report 
conditions on the ground. Officers will also have to establish security and continue 
the sharing of information so the jurisdictional authorities can coordinate the overall 
response. An incident of this magnitude will activate the Multi-agency Coordination 
Center (Emergency Operations Center [EOC]) where the local emergency manager 
can coordinate the support activities and quickly report needs to the state and 
communicate protective action recommendations quickly and effectively to elected 
officials, the media, and the public (DOE 2000). 
The urgencies stated above amplify the need for law enforcement officers to 
be properly trained and equipped to handle an attack. They will need help from 
state and federal agencies. However, in that period of time before other agencies 
arrive, they are on their own. During that time difficult decisions must be made and 
training must take over. Gordon M. Sachs states that responders must make some 
difficult decisions: 
"The first instinct for emergency responders at any incident is always to rush 
in and save as many people as possible; however, in a terrorist-related 
incident, there are many factors to consider. Can the victims be saved? Was 
an agent of some type released? If it was, will responders have the means to 
detect it? Will their gear provide adequate protection? These are but a few of 
the questions that we must become accustomed to asking when responding 
to terrorist-related incidents. There is no reason to allow civilians to suffer 
needlessly; neither can there be any reason to send responders haphazardly 
into unknown and dangerous environments (Sachs 2003, pp. vii-viii)." 
These questions are just some of the thoughts considered by the first arriving 
police officers on the scene of a dirty bomb attack. They must have the proper 
confidence in their training and equipment to do the job safely and effectively. 
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The primary responsibilities of law enforcement, arriving on scene of a dirty 
bomb attack should be to recognize the threat, minimize exposure, ensure the safety 
of victims, safeguard the scene, and report to command so proper highly specialized 
units may be brought to the scene to deal with the threat. Police must also 
remember to minimize their own exposure to these agents. Those who rush into a 
scene are likely to become victims themselves adding to the problem (Henry & King 
2004). 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to enlighten and inform law enforcement in the 
event of a dirty bomb attack. There is a need to develop an understanding of what 
the realistic expectations are for a local law enforcement agency if a radiological 
attack occurs. A dirty bomb attack is a very real probability and it is the duty of local 
law enforcement to train and prepare for such an event. 
I chose this particular type of incident based upon professional and academic 
experience. I have found during my law enforcement career that I have had no 
training on my role as a police officer if a dirty bomb attack were to occur. 
Additionally, the purpose of this study is not only to provide myself with the 
information but to be able to assist other officers and agencies in understanding their 
roles as well. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A major problem is that the United States is vulnerable to a ROD terrorism 
event due to the nature of our society. Currently local and state governments in 
concert with public health agencies are drafting and updating emergency response 
plans regarding radiological events (accidental & intentional) that include 
responsibilities for law enforcement. Yet, police officers are unaccustomed to 
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working with radiological agents or responding to radiological incidents and have 
little if any experience in this area. 
Law enforcement must be ready to take immediate and comprehensive action 
once they arrive. Whether it is to block off intersections to allow for security of the 
area or if the focus is to assist in search and rescue efforts, it is the responsibility of 
each officer and supervisor to know what role they should play during the situation 
and how to react. They must also know what type of equipment is needed. 
A key problem is that the police who will be called upon to initially respond to 
a dirty bomb may not be adequately trained to work effectively in that type of 
environment. They lack the highly specific technical training and expertise required 
to recognize and deal with the unique threats posed by such an event. Many also 
lack the special tools, gear, and protective equipment that may be required during a 
radiological event (Henry & King, 2004). In accordance with the Code of Federal 
Regulations, 29 CFR 1910-120, Hazard Waste and Response Operations, specified 
protective equipment must be donned to operate in the hazardous environment. 
Failure to do so is not only a violation of the federal statute, but exposes emergency 
responders to undue risk. 
In the initial stage of the incident, local law enforcement along with local fire 
departments will be in control of the crisis. Unfortunately, federal support for the 
first-responder community has lacked a comprehensive and cohesive strategy since 
the first large-scale program of financial and training assistance was authorized by 
Congress in 1996 (Scardaville & Spencer 2002). Post 9/11, local agencies are now 
receiving assistance through federal grants but every year the rules in regard to 
assistance change. Each local community must meet certain federal guidelines to 
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receive Homeland Security funding to obtain this much needed training and 
equipment. These guidelines govern what a locality can and cannot receive. 
In its third annual report to Congress, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
highlighted a number of problems. In its survey of state and local first responders, 
the commission found that the majority of first responders who participated in 
federal training programs found them to be beneficial . but also noted that the 
programs were unable to train or equip enough personnel (Gilmore Commission 
2001). Additionally, the Gilmore Commission found that one of the primary barriers 
to first responders' participation in federal training programs was their lack of 
knowledge about what types of training programs were available to local law 
enforcement agencies (Scardaville & Spencer 2002). 
The RAND Corporation did a comprehensive review of the September 11, 
2001, attacks entitled Protecting Emergency Responders: Lesson Learned from 
Terrorist Attacks. The review covers the needs for the proper equipment when 
responding to a disaster. Although the attacks on the World Trade Center did not 
include a radiological contaminant, it was a terrorist event causing mass death and 
destruction. The toxic fumes that filled the air for the days, weeks and months 
following the attack illustrated the uses and limitations of equipment needed for a 
dirty bomb attack. The most obvious equipment problem is that of personal 
protection equipment (PPE). Personal protection clothing and equipment is defined 
as having the capability to protect responders, from the effects of chemical, 
biological, and radiological agents as well as blast and incendiary devices. 
It is noted that from the experiences at these 9/11 attack sites; it is clear that 
there were significant shortfalls in the way responders were protected. Many 
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responders suggested that the PPE even impeded their ability to accomplish their 
missions (Jackson et al. 2002). 
The study found that personnel had not been properly trained in the 
operations and limitations of PPE that was being used nor was it of the caliber 
needed to sustain longevity in that type of a situation. Protective clothing and 
respirators exhibited serious shortcomings in that many equipment systems are 
incompatible which led to them not being used at ground zero. Also, first responders 
reported that equipment was not comfortable enough to allow extended wear during 
demanding physical labor that was called for at the site of the attack (Jackson et al. 
2002). 
Another element to consider is communications. Law enforcement personnel 
must be able to talk to each other. There must be a command and control structure 
set up that allows all of the various first responders - police, fire and emergency 
medical services (EMS) - to work together in those first crucial hours and days. 
Radio communication is at the core of this issue. It was during the 9/11 attacks, 
especially in New York City, where law enforcement could not talk with each other. 
The New York Police Department (NYPD) couldn't communicate with all of their 
people, let alone the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD). Within the NYPD, the 
Emergency Service Unit (ESU) had the most effective communication system 
because of their small size and specific job function (9/11 Commission 2004). 
Proper radio communication equipment must be utilized by all responders. Although 
the federal government has developed and implemented programs for 
communications interoperability, the problem of inadequate communications among 
and between different emergency responders still exists today. 
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Many local communities because of their limited size and budgets will not 
have the ability to cope with a radiological attack. They will have to rely heavily on 
the fact that the state and federal government are prepared to respond. Local 
HAZMAT teams and the local healthcare sector will only be able to do so much. In 
order to fully understand what the dangers are a radiological attack, one must 
understand the dangers of such an attack. 
RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK TYPES 
There are two types of major attacks one must be concerned about when it 
comes to a radiological incident. They are radiological and nuclear. Any attack that 
has one or both of these elements could have a devastating affect on a community. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes these two types in 
the following manner: 
• Radiological Dispersion Device (Dirty Bomb): "Terrorist use of an RDD-
often called 'dirty nuke' or 'dirty bomb'-is considered far more likely than use 
of a nuclear explosive device. An ROD combines a conventional explosive 
device-such as a bomb-with radioactive material. It is designed to scatter 
dangerous and sub-lethal amounts of radioactive material over a general 
area. Such RDDs appeal to terrorists because they require limited technical 
knowledge to build and deploy compared to a nuclear device. Also, the 
radioactive materials in RDDs are widely used in medicine, agriculture, 
industry, and research, and are easier to obtain than weapons grade uranium 
or plutonium (FEMA 2008)." 
"The primary purpose for a terrorist to use an ROD is to cause psychological fear 
and economic disruption. Some devices could cause fatalities from exposure to 
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radioactive materials. Depending on the speed at which the area of the RDD 
detonation was evacuated or how successful people were at sheltering-in-place, the 
number of deaths and injuries from an RDD might not be substantially greater than 
from a conventional bomb explosion (FEMA 2008, paragraph 2)." 
"The size of the affected area and the level of destruction caused by an RDD 
would depend on the sophistication and size of the conventional bomb, the type of 
radioactive material used, the quality and quantity of the radioactive material, and 
the local meteorological conditions-primarily wind and precipitation. The area 
affected could be placed off-limits to the public for several months or much longer 
during cleanup efforts (FEMA 2008, paragraph 3)." 
• Nuclear Blast: "A nuclear blast is an explosion with intense light and heat, a 
damaging pressure wave, and widespread radioactive material that can 
contaminate the air, water, and ground surfaces for miles around. A nuclear 
device can range from a weapon carried by an intercontinental missile 
launched by a hostile nation or terrorist organization, to a small portable 
nuclear device transported by an individual. All nuclear devices cause deadly 
effects when exploded, including blinding light, intense heat (thermal 
radiation), initial nuclear radiation, blast, fires started by the heat pulse, and 
secondary fires caused by the destruction (FEMA 2008, paragraph 1)." 
The fact that a terrorist organization may use one of these weapons has been 
feared for decades. Today there is a mounting realism that countries such as 
Pakistan, Iran, North Korea and former Soviet Union states could be sources for 
radioactive and nuclear materials or devices to support terrorist operations. 
Terrorists could obtain the material from a variety of sources to create these 
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weapons. The need for enhanced security and monitoring of these facilities is 
critically important. 
Another threat also posed is the intentional release of radiological material 
from a nuclear power plant. A terrorist organization could use a nuclear power plant 
as a weapon, in a way similar to terrorists crashing airliners into the World Trade 
Center towers so they would collapse. Destroying a reactor could achieve the same 
result as setting off a dirty bomb. 
The local economy, infrastructure and population would be devastated by any 
one of these occurrences. While it is impossible to predict the exact toll on the 
community there are many factors to be considered. These could include: size of the 
weapon, amount of release (to include an accident), wind direction, population 
present, emergency planning and response, preparation of the local health 
community, number of hospitals, etc. Therefore, communities must be ready for any 
event. 
RADIATION TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
The Health Physics Society (website) describes the following radiation types 
and their characteristics. 
Alpha Radiation: Alpha radiation is a heavy, very short-range particle and is 
actually an ejected helium nucleus. Some characteristics of alpha radiation are: 
• Most alpha radiation is not able to penetrate human skin. 
• Alpha-emitting materials can be harmful to humans if the materials are 
inhaled, swallowed, or absorbed through open wounds. 
• A variety of instruments has been designed to measure alpha 
radiation. Special training in the use of these instruments is essential 
for making accurate measurements. 
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• A thin-window Geiger-Mueller (GM) probe can detect the presence of 
alpha radiation. 
• Instruments cannot detect alpha radiation through even a thin layer of 
water, dust, paper, or other material, because alpha radiation is not 
penetrating. 
• Alpha radiation travels only a short distance (a few inches) in air, but 
is not an external hazard. 
• Examples of some alpha emitters: radium, radon, uranium, thorium. 
Beta Radiation: Beta radiation is a light, short-range particle and is actually an 
ejected electron. Some characteristics of beta radiation are: 
• Beta radiation may travel several feet in air and is moderately 
penetrating. 
• Beta radiation can penetrate human skin to the "germinal layer," 
where new skin cells are produced. If high levels of beta-emitting 
contaminants are allowed to remain on the skin for a prolonged period 
of time, they may cause skin injury. 
• Beta-emitting contaminants may be harmful if deposited internally. 
• Most beta emitters can be detected with a survey instrument and a 
thin-window GM probe (e.g., "pancake" type). Some beta emitters, 
however, produce very low-energy, poorly penetrating radiation that 
may be difficult or impossible to detect. Examples of these difficult-to-
detect beta emitters are hydrogen-3 (tritium), carbon-14, and sulfur-
35. 
• Clothing provides some protection against beta radiation. 
• Examples of some pure beta emitters: strontium-90, carbon-14, 
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tritium, and sulfur-35 
Gamma and X Radiation: Gamma radiation and X-rays are highly penetrating 
electromagnetic radiation. Some characteristics of these radiations are: 
• Gamma radiation or X-rays are able to travel many feet in air and 
many inches in human tissue. They readily penetrate most materials 
and are sometimes called "penetrating" radiation. 
• X-rays are like gamma rays. X-rays, too, are penetrating radiation. 
Sealed radioactive sources and machines that emit gamma radiation 
and X-rays respectively constitute mainly an external hazard to 
humans. 
• Gamma radiation and X-rays are electromagnetic radiation like visible 
light, radiowaves, and ultraviolet light. These electromagnetic 
radiations differ only in the amount of energy they have. Gamma rays 
and X-rays are the most energetic of these. 
• Dense materials are needed for shielding from gamma radiation. 
Clothing provides little shielding from penetrating radiation, but will 
prevent contamination of the skin by gamma-emitting radioactive 
materials. 
• Gamma radiation is easily detected by survey meters with a sodium 
iodide detector probe. 
• Gamma radiation and/or characteristic X-rays frequently accompany 
the emission of alpha and beta radiation during radioactive decay. 
• Examples of some gamma emitters: iodine-131, cesium-137, cobalt-
60, radium-226, and technetium-99m. 
The responding officers must also know the difference between signs and 
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symptoms of an attack. 
• Signs: Indicators that can be observed by the responder without necessarily 
communicating with the victim. Vomiting, seizures, coughing, and drooling 
are examples (Drielak & Brandon, 2000). 
• Symptoms: Sensations that are experienced by the victim and must be 
expressed by the victim because they may not be readily visible to another 
person. Symptoms may include dizziness, vision impairment, headaches, and 
nausea (Drielak & Brandon 2000). 
The damage caused to the human body depends on the amount of and type of 
radiation the body is exposed to during the incident. Radiation can affect people in 
different ways making it difficult to determine what dose is needed to be fatal. Acute 
Radiation Syndrome can occur after exposure to a high dose of radiation; this causes 
the body to shut down. The increased risk of cancer is a primary concern of those 
exposed to radiation (USNRC 2009). 
UNDERSTANDING RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
A Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) otherwise known as a dirty bomb is 
made with a conventional explosive that is wrapped with radioactive material. The 
materials used to create a dirty bomb can be found worldwide. These materials are 
routinely used in industrial and medical applications. An oil probe or a radiotherapy 
machine contains radioactive material (CSIS 2000). Even with the abundance of 
material available only a fraction of it contains enough to make a dirty bomb, but is 
cause for serious concern (Ferguson et al. 2006). 
There is a debate over what the potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack would 
be on a population. The Federation of American Scientists states in regard to the 
effects of a small dirty bomb attack that it could cause the evacuation if not 
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abandonment of an area of approximately forty city blocks. If decontamination was 
not possible this area could remain abandoned for decades (FAS 2005). The real 
threat, which does not appear to be disputed, is the tremendous psychological effect 
and the political impact it will carry (Ford 1998). There is no doubt the terrorists fully 
understand the psychological effects which is why a dirty bomb would be deemed a 
"weapon of choice" among terror groups (Medalia 2004). 
RADIATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT 
There may not be a better weapon for a terrorist organization to use than 
radiation. The use of a dirty bomb by a terrorist organization would cause 
catastrophic psychological damage. A RDD attack could cause a residual fear in the 
population about their safety and the safety of their environment due to possible 
physical contamination, their own exposure to radiation, and the long-term effects of 
radioactive fallout (Ferguson et al. 2004). Society would be overrun with fear. If 
thousands of Americans were killed it would destabilize the public confidence in 
government and its ability to protect them. The economic impact would be enormous 
and could force the country into a very turbulent period. 
Just the word alone, radiation, produces fear. Since the United States first set 
out to build an atomic/nuclear bomb during World War II, radiation has been feared. 
The Cold War came next and decades of warnings about the dangers of nuclear war 
and the after effects of radiation. The fear of radiation is well grounded in the fact 
that radiation exposure can cause cancer and birth defects. Radiation is invisible and 
undetectable without specialized equipment. This only adds the notion of fear of this 
weapon. The terms "nuclear," "radioactive," and "deadly," all contribute to instilling 
an initial feeling of fear regarding radioactive materials (Johnson 2006). 
With the fear that will be instilled in the public after a radiological attack it is 
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anticipated that the number of people requesting to be tested for exposure to 
radiation will be much higher than those that have actually been exposed 
(Harrington & Jensen 2006). This theory is supported by the number of citizens that 
reported suspected anthrax when a white powder was observed in the winter months 
of 2001. The fear of radiation grows each time an accidental release occurs. In 1987 
there was an accidental release of Cesium-137, a radioactive material in Goiania, 
Brazil. Although only five died and 244 were found to be contaminated more than 
100,000 thought they might have been exposed (NBC 2008). Panic and fear were 
widespread in that area after the release. 
Not only will the civilian population fear a radiological attack, so will the first 
responders, particularly law enforcement. They must be prepared to operate 
effectively following a radiation attack. They must be properly equipped with 
personal protective equipment. They will have to rely on local hazardous material 
personnel and their detection equipment. Those officers on the front line must also 
understand the real hazards of radiation and must be mentally prepared to handle it. 
The psychological effects of a terrorist attack are far reaching. There must be 
an understanding of what those effects will be on the civilian population as well as on 
first responders. With radiological terrorism it is important to know that psychological 
effects will be significant whether or not there are mass casualties. "It is imperative 
that the public be psychologically immunized against the radiological attack threat, 
through an extensive public education campaign that leads citizens to understand: 
(1) that such attacks rarely pose immediate threats to life; (2) that the decision to 
shelter or flee will depend on the circumstances of the event and that minimizing risk 
to personal health will depend on rapidly receiving and adhering to guidance from 
government authorities, and; (3) that proper treatment can greatly reduce long-term 
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health effects in many cases (Ferguson et al. 2004)." 
Because of the widespread and long-lasting threats posed by a radiological 
event it is imperative the local community be prepared to mitigate, prepare, respond 
and recover after a radiological release event, no matter the cause of it. 
THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
MITIGATION. The first phase of the disaster management cycle is 
mitigation. ''Mitigation is those activities designed to prevent or reduce losses from 
disaster. It is usually considered the initial phase of emergency management. 
Examples include land-use planning to limit or prevent development in floodplains, 
building codes to reduce losses from earthquakes and hurricanes and fires, dams and 
levees to prevent flooding, and designing buildings to facilitate surveillance to lessen 
the likelihood that terrorists can plant bombs (Waugh 2000, p. 49)." 
Mitigation for a dirty bomb attack is difficult. Trying to prevent a terrorist 
attack is not like trying to prevent the flooding of an area by applying land 
management techniques. You cannot build a levee that will stop a dirty bomb 
attack. The best hope for the use of mitigation is to prepare for known elements. For 
example, Richmond, Virginia, has two nuclear power plants within a very short 
distance (about a one-hour drive) to the community. Mitigation can be applied here 
by use of regulatory guidelines. Response plans can be made. With a known factor, 
like a nuclear power plant, the community can effectively mitigate against the 
chance of an accidental leak. 
There are several major target types that a terrorist may want to strike. 
When these targets are identified, it provides emergency planners the ability to put 
mitigation strategies into play to prevent an attack or minimize damage. The 
following chart is a list of likely terrorist targets (Heyer 2005): 
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Most Likely Terrorist Targets 
Government offices Military installations Landmark buildings 
Events with high Abortion clinics Post offices 
_Qo_Qulations 
Power facilities Water supplies Corporate Headquarters 
Police stations Train terminals Bus terminals 
Airports Tunnels Bridges 
Fuel depots Cruise ships Other critical infrastructure 
and/or k~ resources 
Source: (Heyer 2005) 
Mitigation must also include planning elements and early detection strategies. 
The best way to mitigate an attack is to stop it before it happens. Law enforcement, 
at all levels, plays a critical role in this step. Law enforcement should focus on 
activities related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate and conduct 
operations related to potential terrorist activities (OCP 2008). 
The other key factor in preventing an attack is the actual detection of 
radiological materials. The ability to stop a RDD event starts with the early detection 
of the import, transport, manufacture or release of the materials. The focus should 
be placed on training, communication, and coordination with the intelligence 
community (OCP 2008). Efforts are continuing to develop the needed the 
technologies to detect these types of RDD's. The placement of detection equipment 
must also be brought into consideration. Recognizing the most likely places these 
materials will enter a country or region will be the key in the mitigation strategy. 
Mitigation is only the first step in being ready for a dirty bomb attack. 
Emergency managers will face many tough decisions about how to properly mitigate 
against an attack they cannot predict. Emergency managers must rely on history 
and proper analysis to make the accurate choices in using mitigation techniques. 
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PREPAREDNESS. "Preparedness is planning how to respond in an emergency 
or a disaster, and developing capabilities for a more effective response. Examples 
include training programs for emergency responders and the public, warning 
systems, disaster communication systems, and contingency planning (Waugh 2000, 
p.49)." "The purpose of preparedness is to anticipate problems in disasters so that 
ways can be devised to address the problems effectively and so that the resources 
needed for an effective response are in place beforehand (Mileti 1999, p.215)." 
Preparedness for a radiological attack or accident must be of high importance 
to a local community. The ability to be able to effectively plan for such an event will 
pay dividends for the community if such an event ever occurs. In today's world the 
chance of an attack on a specific community in America is still a comparably small 
one. However, as time passes the chance of another attack on American soil 
increases. Any area where a large number of casualties could result must be 
considered a target. 
The CDC (website) recommends the following to ensure preparedness and 
prevention: 
• Maintain a public health preparedness and response cooperative 
agreement that provides support to state health agencies who are working 
with local agencies in developing coordinated bioterrorism and radiological 
release plans and protocols (CDC 2007). 
• Establish a national public health distance-learning system that provides 
radiological terrorism preparedness training to health-care workers and to 
state and local public health workers (CDC 2007). 
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• Disseminate public health guidelines and performance standards on 
radiological terrorism preparedness planning for use by state and local 
health agencies (CDC 2007). 
In order to be prepared for a dirty bomb attack, law enforcement must be 
able to recognize the signs of an attack. There are many early-warning indicators of 
a radiological attack. In all but the largest cities, detection equipment may not be 
available. All first responders should consider whether an attack might have taken 
place if any of the following are noticed. According to a 2005 report by Robert Heyer 
the following are key warning signs: 
• Unusual numbers of people dying in an area, or from strange causes. 
• Unusual numbers of sick or dying animals, birds or fish. 
• Lack of insect life where it should be seen. 
• Unusual numbers of people in an area complaining of blisters/rashes, nausea, 
disorientation, difficulty in breathing, convulsions, localized sweating, 
conjunctivitis (reddening of the eyes), erythema (reddening of the skin), or 
any irregular symptoms. 
• Strange colored smoke coming from the area of a detonation. 
• Explosions that seem to do very little damage or which release an unusual 
amount of smoke, or leave droplets of liquid in the area, or fragments 
covered with liquid or droplets. 
• Unusual appearance of any liquid droplets, particularly where there should be 
none. 
• Abandoned aerosol sprayers in the area of sick people. 
• People reporting unusual odors or tastes. 
• Unexplained mists or hazes in urban area. 
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• Sudden or unexplained appearance of low-lying clouds. 
• Unidentified, low-flying aircraft--particularly crop dusters--over a populated 
area. 
Preparedness is the most important step in the disaster management cycle 
for local communities. This phase includes needed planning and training for a dirty 
bomb attack. Neither of the remaining two phases can go well for emergency 
managers and responders it they have not adequately prepared. 
RESPONSE. "Response is the immediate reaction to disaster. It may occur as 
the disaster is anticipated, as well as soon after it begins. Examples include mass 
evacuation, sandbagging buildings and other structures, securing emergency food 
and water, covering windows, providing emergency medical services, search and 
rescue, firefighting, and restoring public order to prevent looting (Waugh 2000, 
p.49)." 
As with all disasters, the initial response will come from the local community. 
In this case, that means the local healthcare sector and adjoining agencies that have 
HAZMAT teams will be the first responders along with your front line fire, police and 
medical personnel. The actions of these first responders, their training, planning and 
preparedness will directly determine how successful the response to an attack or a 
radiological release will be. 
A primary responder from the federal government for a radiological attack will 
be the CDC. The CDC (website) recommends they take the following actions in 
response to such an attack: 
• Assist state and local health agencies in organizing response capacities to 
rapidly deploy in the event of an overt attack that might be the result of a 
covert attack. 
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• Ensure that procedures are in place for rapid mobilization of CDC 
terrorism response teams that will provide on-site assistance to local 
health workers, security agents, and law enforcement officers. 
• Establish a national pharmaceutical s~ockpile to provide medical supplies 
in the event of a terrorist attack that involves radioactive agents. 
• Establish a national electronic infrastructure to improve exchange of 
emergency health information among local, state, and federal health 
agencies. 
• Implement an emergency communication plan that ensures rapid 
dissemination of health information to the public during actual, 
threatened, or suspected acts of radiological terrorism. 
• Create a website that disseminates radiological preparedness and training 
information, as well as other related emergency information, to public 
health and health-care workers and the general public. 
The first responder will have much to think about when responding to a 
radiological attack. The most critical consideration is the safety the responders 
themselves. Protective clothing and respiratory protection at the appropriate level of 
safety must be used. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) should be worn whenever 
a radiological incident is suspected. Responders must remember the time-distance-
shielding rule for protection. Responders should spend as little time as possible in the 
hazard zone, keeping distance from the contaminated area. They should shield 
themselves from the hazard at all times. And decontaminate as soon and as 
thoroughly as possible. The effectiveness of a first responder is compromised when 
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they become a casualty themselves (Heyer 2005). The first responder must keep in 
mind that he or she can be of no assistance if they fall victim to the attack. 
All facets of the government will aid in the response to an attack. Numerous 
groups will be required in the response phase to complete the mission. According to 
a 2008 study by the Virginia Office of Commonwealth Preparedness these are the 
key groups used in response to a radiological attack are: 
• Firefighting Operations/Support 
• Urban Search and Rescue 
• Emergency Public Information and Warning 
• Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding, and Related Services) 
• Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment 
• Economic and Community Recovery 
• Public Safety and Security Response 
• Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution 
• Responder Safety and Health 
• Emergency Operations Center Management 
• On-Site Incident Management 
The federal government will come to the aid of the local community and bring 
with it its' vast resources. The downfall is that it will take time to get these resources 
in place. But with proper preparedness by all levels of government, the response 
phase will show that the training and planning, if done right, will pay off in the end. 
RECOVERY. "Recovery is those activities that continue beyond the 
emergency period to restore lifelines. Examples include providing temporary shelter, 
restoring power, critical stress debriefing for emergency responders and victims, job 
assistance, small business loans, and debris clearance (Waugh 2000, p. 49)." 
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The recovery phase is a difficult one to gauge for a community. The variables 
are dependent upon the type and size of an attack or release. In some cases only 
minor, localized damage will occur and recovery will speed along. However, if the 
incident is large in scope, a myriad of potential problems arise. Areas may have to be 
evacuated for long periods of time. Water and food systems could be contaminated 
for an undetermined time. Even in a small attack the cleaning of buildings may take 
weeks. As an example, the U.S. Congress was shut down nearly a week alone after 
the Anthrax attacks in 2001 (CNN.com 2001). 
Recovery will not be easy. Cleanup won't be as simple as rebuilding a home, 
clearing streets or restoring power. Many radiological agents can last for long periods 
of time, decades even, and represent a continuous hazard to the community. The 
recovery operation in Chernobyl is still ongoing today, more than twenty-three years 
after the radiation accident at the nuclear power plant. Recovery will be a great 
unknown until, sadly, a major radiological or dirty bomb attack occurs in the U.S. 
III. METHOD 
In order to analyze the appropriate role of law enforcement in response to a 
radiological or dirty bomb attack, a qualitative study was warranted. The goal was to 
answer the research questions that had been developed to determine what the role 
of a law enforcement officer is during a dirty bomb attack. The research was divided 
into four sections that would allow me to analyze each particular part of the 
research. The research necessitated a thorough review of existing literature and 
extant documents to identify what, if any, standards exist. 
Section 1 
The literature and extant document review focused on evaluating current 
radiological attacks types. Next, the different types and characteristics of radiation 
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were examined. Additionally, definitions or terms or phrases associated with a 
radiological attack were discussed. The purpose of this section is to establish a base 
of knowledge on how radiation works and why a dirty bomb attack would be so 
destructive. 
Section 2 
Section 2 of the research consisted of forming an understanding of what a 
dirty bomb can do and how it affects law enforcement. To do this, literature was 
reviewed that showed the psychological impact on not only victims but first 
responders. After establishing the affects of a dirty bomb on society I used a review 
of the disaster management cycle to identify strategies of each stage. This allowed 
for showing how all four phases (mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery) 
relate to the role of a law enforcement officer. 
Section 3 
Section 3 is the collection of data. The results were gathered by examining 
governmental reports, professional journals, federal, state and local documents, 
official websites, and newspaper and magazine articles. In order to properly define 
the role of law enforcement officer during a dirty bomb attack, the research had to 
be conducted in the following categories: 
• Phases of radiation response. 
• Responding to a dirty bomb attack. 
• Law enforcement in the contaminated area. 
• Training; past, present and future. 
• Safety devices and equipment needs. 
• Other responding agencies. 
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Section 4 
The purpose of Section 4 is to provide an analysis of the results. This section 
reveals what the research indicates the role of the law enforcement officer should be 
in the event of a dirty bomb attack. The section examines if there is a clearly defined 
role for law enforcement, what that role is, if a model exists, if there are accepted 
protocols, and finally, what recommendations can be developed to further define 
these issues. 
Limitations 
Since there has never been a dirty bomb attack on U.S. soil, there is no 
existing research identifying what law enforcement did right or wrong during the 
event. This left only being able to look at previous WMD incidents, using other forms 
attack, and comparing other post-event analysis to this research. 
IV. RESULTS 
The role law enforcement assumes in various disaster scenarios has been 
continually updated since the events of September 11, 2001. That singular event 
forced the law enforcement community to take a critical look at existing response 
programs and develop a systems approach for the future. It is widely accepted 
terrorist groups will continue to attempt to obtain radioactive material with the goal 
of attacking targets in the U.S. Consequently, response assets must be ready. Law 
enforcement will be the first on the scene where decisions made in the initial stages 
of the incident will contribute greatly the overall success of the response effort. They 
must be given the capability to detect radiological materials and be provided with 
timely technical information and evacuation advice (McBroom 2002). 
Law enforcement can anticipate a radiation event occurring in several scenarios: 
• Industrial accidents during normal day-to-day handling, or transportation of 
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radioactive materials. 
• Intentional sabotage of storage or transportation vessels containing 
radioactive materials for malicious purpose. This may include nuclear facilities 
such as, power plants, or industrial facilities (Ferguson et al. 2004). 
• Detonation of a tactical nuclear weapon such as nuclear artillery shells, land 
mines, "suit case" bombs, etc. Tactical nuclear weapons from the former 
Warsaw Pact countries arsenal could theoretically be used conventionally by 
terrorist groups if they fall into the wrong hands (Ferguson et al. 2004). 
• The distribution of radioactive materials via a dirty bomb (Radiation Dispersal 
Device). A dirty bomb is radioactive material packaged with explosives for the 
intended purpose of spreading radiation (Health Physics Society 2005). 
• Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): the formation of a nuclear-yield reaction 
that can be an improvised weapon with acquired nuclear materials, or 
modification to a U.S. or foreign nuclear weapon (Health Physics Society 2005). 
PHASES OF A RADATION RESPONSE 
To help define the role of law enforcement in response to a radiological or 
dirty bomb attack it is essential to understand the three phases of response under 
that particular scenario (DHS 2008). According to the Department of Homeland 
Security (OHS, Preparedness directorate; Protective Action Guidelines 2006, p. 176) 
these phases are defined as the early phase, intermediate phase and the late phase. 
Below is a summary of each phase based on DHS descriptions: 
1. Early Phase The first phase is referred to as the "Early Phase" which is the 
emergency phase. This period starts at the onset of the emergency and can range in 
time from several hours up to several days. During the early phase, the initial 
protective actions by public safety personnel, such as fire, law enforcement and EMS, 
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will be taking appropriate actions such as isolating the scene, denying entry and 
identifying the nature of the incident. 
Additional actions including sheltering populations in place, potential 
evacuation, initial treatment, transportation and decontamination of victims, scene 
stabilization and public health protective actions will occur during the early stages of 
the incident measured in hours (OHS 2006). "The first people likely to respond to a 
radiation emergency are the same law enforcement, firemen, hazardous materials 
teams, emergency medical technicians who respond to other emergencies (NCRP 
2006, webpage press release)." 
2. Intermediate Phase The intermediate phase will overlap with the early 
phase but is usually assumed to begin once the initial control and protective action 
decisions have been made. During this time, more technical information is gathered 
regarding field measurements of total exposure and specific characteristics of the 
radioactive materials involved. The timeline for the intermediate phase is assumed 
to be weeks to months until the protective actions of the incident are concluded. 
This phase will overlap with the final phase of the incident where initial 
considerations for recovery and cleanup actions are considered (OHS, 2008). The 
role of law enforcement becomes more traditional during this phase. 
3. Late Phase The late phase is the final phase of the radiation incident. 
During this phase actions will be taken to reduce the radiation levels in the 
environment and make way for recovery of the affected area from the incident. In 
this period, there is no longer an "emergency situation." The collaboration of 
community, regional and federal leaders will be essential to the restoration of the 
site to encompass sound decisions in making cost-effective decisions. As currently 
provided by EPA standards, twice the background radiation levels is considered 
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"contamination." During the recovery stage of a radiation incident, it may become 
cost prohibitive to clean up a large area to such an exact standard, requiring the 
input of community stakeholders to make choices based on sound scientific data 
(DHS 2008). By this time law enforcement personnel would have returned to normal 
operations and would only be used on a requested basis from a monitoring agency. 
RESPONSE TO A DIRTY BOMB ATTACK 
Response to a radiation accident differs from response to a radiological terrorist 
attack. Accidents generally happen in radiation facilities where there is resident 
expertise and pre-planned response guidelines for specific releases of known 
materials. Often there is a sufficient time in anticipation of the accident to activate 
pre-developed response plans (Federal Register 71, no. 1, 2006). Radioactive 
materials involved in accidents are generally well identified and the hazard is 
immediately known once an accident occurs. Both the transportation routes and 
location of fixed facilities for large radioactive sources are located in areas where 
accidents, generally, will impact the least amount of people (Federal Register 71, no. 
1, 2006). 
Conversely, terrorist attacks will be intentionally committed in areas where the 
largest impact will occur. The radionuclide or quantity will not be immediately known 
and will remain unknown until responders arrive on scene with appropriate 
equipment to evaluate the hazard. Protective actions will be needed immediately. 
Without a specific radiation response plan, emergency workers may find themselves 
over-committed in the contaminated area, becoming contaminated and exposed to 
harmful radiation levels. "Response techniques, therefore, must be modified so that 
emergency responders are able to protect themselves while saving as many lives as 
possible (Ferguson et al. 2004, p.91)." 
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• Defining the exclusion zone is the most important first response, and a simple 
alarming dosimeter is the most useful piece of equipment for initial radiation 
response (Conca & Reynolds 2006). 
• By following emergency response protocols for radiation that are aligned with 
nationally recognized standards for allowable dose rates to radiation for 
emergency response, first responders can operate safely in the initial phase of 
a radiation incident (Conca & Reynolds 2006). 
• The greater the dispersion of material, the greater the affected area, but the 
lower the radiation dose rate (Conca & Reynolds 2006). 
• Individuals with no significant physical injuries should not be significantly 
contaminated (Conca & Reynolds 2006). 
• Firefighting PPE will be sufficient protection for alpha and beta radiation, 
nothing will be practical to wear to protect from gamma radiation. Utilizing 
time distance and source shielding is the most practical approach to protection 
from gamma radiation (Conca & Reynolds 2006). 
Early detection is critical, but the radiation dose monitoring of first responders 
is also important to ensure their doses are kept within safe ranges during the 
incident. 
The early notification and accurate assessment of a radiological event is 
absolutely paramount in the management of a radiation emergency. Most fire 
agencies throughout the country have dosimeters at their disposal to detect radiation 
in the atmosphere. However, many law enforcement agencies do not have this 
technology in use. They are reliant on others to inform them of an attack and then 
acquire the needed detection devices after an incident response has begun. The 
procurement and distribution of radiological dosimeters to the area law enforcement 
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agencies is essential. Law enforcement in most cases will be the first arriving 
emergency resource on scene. Therefore, they need to have the early radiation 
detection capability to ensure the proper protective actions and notifications are 
made during the initial stages of a radiation incident. Law enforcement agencies, 
especially those in high risk areas around the country, must have and deploy 
dosimeters to all front line personnel. 
There are several basic tasks a law enforcement officer must complete when 
responding to a dirty bomb attack (Drielak & Brandon 2000). They are: 
• Scene assessment. 
• Site security. 
• Stopping further harm from occurring. 
• Aiding the injured. 
• Initiating a criminal investigation. 
• Assisting other agencies in performing their duties. 
• Restoring order and public confidence. 
There will be many things for the initial responding personnel to think about 
prior to and after they arrive on scene of a dirty bomb attack. Below is a list of 
recommendations by Steven Drielak and Thomas Brandon (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Response and Investigation 2000, p. 199-200) for what types of 
information should be gathered by communication officers, and what types of 
protocols first responders and supervisors should follow: 
Communications: 
• Determine whether the incident has occurred, is ongoing, or is a threat. 
• Obtain as much information about the situation as possible including the 
following: 
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• What types of materials are involved? 
• How many people are affected? 
• What are the signs and symptoms of the injured people? 
• Has there been a fire or explosion? 
• What is the exact location of the incident? 
• Assign sufficient personnel, including supervision, to the initial response. 
• Make other notifications as requested by response personnel. 
First Responders: 
• Approach the scene from an upwind and uphill direction. 
• Park vehicles a safe distance from the scene and keep access routes open for 
other emergency traffic. 
• Be alert for the possibility of secondary or additional devices. 
• Do not touch or otherwise handle any suspect devices or materials. 
• Restrict access to the scene. 
• Identify and record those leaving the scene. 
• Avoid contact with contaminated victims. 
• Request additional assistance, including specialized resources such as bomb 
squads and HazMat teams as soon as possible. 
• Assist in the evacuation of the danger area. 
• If the material is identified, refer to the appropriate guide in the North 
American Emergency Response Guidebook. 
• Isolate the affected areas and victims. 
• Assist in directing victims to decontamination or triage areas. 
• Provide security for the scene. 
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Supervisors: 
• Establish a command post in conjunction with other agencies. 
• Notify appropriate investigative personnel. 
• Request sufficient manpower and resources to secure the perimeter. 
• Maintain strict accountability of law enforcement personnel at the scene. 
• Designate a staging area for law enforcement resources. 
• Begin assigning positions within the ICS. 
• Designate a media area. 
• Establish an incident log to document all actions taken. 
• Ensure the appropriate notifications have been made. 
RECOGNITION OF DEVICES 
All law enforcement officers should have a working knowledge to recognize a 
ROD attack before, during and after an incident. There is a great likelihood that 
officers will be called upon to search the area to determine if any other devices are 
present. 
Detection devices should be made available to law enforcement personnel. 
Detection devices available are things such as canines, chemical agent detectors, 
direct reading instruments and radiological detection equipment. 
When searching for a suspected ROD an officer should keep the following in 
mind (Drielak & Brandon 2000, p. 26-27): 
• Do not touch or otherwise disturb anything they consider to be suspicious; 
secure the immediate area and call for expert assistance. 
• Do not become complacent while searching. 
• Do not stop searching or become less vigilant when a suspicious item is 
located; there may be several well hidden devices. 
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• Those conducting the search should not use devices such as radios and cell 
phones. 
• The search should be conducted in a methodical manner so that no area is 
overlooked. 
• Do not overlook obvious locations where a device may be located. 
SCENE SECURITY 
When a dirty bomb attack takes place, a crime has been committed. A top 
priority for responding law enforcement personnel will be to ensure the preservation 
and security of the crime scene. The scene will be divided into three areas. The first 
is the hot zone or restricted zone. The second is the warm zone, otherwise known as 
the limited access zone or contamination zone. The third zone is the cold zone also 
known as the support or safe zone. 
The restricted zone will be for personnel who are equipped with the proper PPE. 
Personnel entering this zone would include rescuers of victims, investigators, 
HAZMAT personnel and those needed to render the device safe (Drielak & Brandon 
2000). 
The limited access zone will also require the use of PPE. Decontamination will 
take place in this zone. Here entrance and exit corridors will be established for 
entrance into the restricted zone (Drielak & Brandon 2000). 
The support zone will be the last area of restricted access and does not require 
PPE. The command post and support operations will be in this zone. Things included 
in this zone may include staging areas, media area, and medical facilities (Drielak & 
Brandon 2000). 
The outer layer of scene security for law enforcement begins in the support 
zone. This is similar to any other crime scene, just on a larger scale. All personnel 
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entering this area should be indentified and documented to preserve the crime 
scene. This process will continue as personnel continue through all other zones. 
Having a secure scene is critical to the investigation of the incident. A secure scene 
will accomplish the following objectives (Drielak & Brandon 2000, p. 48): 
• Prevent potential witnesses and/or suspects from leaving the scene. 
• Preserve evidence in place. 
• Prevent others from entering a dangerous scene. 
• Provide a safe working environment for other emergency response personnel. 
• Limit the spread of radiological material beyond the scene. 
Once the scene security is established, the criminal investigation can begin. The 
scene and the victims should be treated with the same degree of attention to details 
as all other types of violent crime. Suspects and witnesses should be identified. 
Preservation of the crime scene should become a priority (Drielak & Brandon 2000). 
CONCERNS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE CONTAMINATION AREA 
Law enforcement will have to constantly remind themselves of the dangers 
they are facing when responding to an attack. First responders should employ the 
protection principles of time, distance, and shielding with regard to encountering 
victims and the scene. There are many immediate dangers to consider such as 
victims may be contaminated and that can pass from victim to responder. Rescuers 
may have to enter the restricted zone to retrieve victims and must be property 
protected. There may be structural damage in the area the device was detonated. 
Secondary devices may also be present. 
MEDICAL TRIAGE AND TREATMENT. Law enforcement personnel will have 
many tasks to perform during a radiological incident, some of which will be outside 
the scope of traditional law enforcement. Besides handling security and crime scene 
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control first responding officers will have to assist fire and medical personnel in the 
performance with medical triage, treatment and transport of radioactively 
contaminated patients. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states that in virtually all 
cases there will be little or no health risk to response personnel provided the follow 
personal protection guidelines. There should not be a health hazard to medical staff 
treating or transporting of contaminated persons provided that they protect 
themselves against the inadvertent ingestion of radioactive material; this is 
accomplished by the use of normal barrier methods (use of surgical gloves and 
mask) and actions to prevent the spread of contamination (e.g., to cover the patient 
in a blanket or sheet), and removal and storage of outer clothing (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 2004). 
The national standards stated by the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Emergency Response Guidebook, states under "First Aid," "the need to address 
medical considerations primarily in radiation incidents. Medical problems take priority 
over radiological concerns; use first aid treatment according to the nature of the 
injury; Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person; Injured 
persons contaminated by contact with released material are not a serious hazard to 
health care personnel, equipment or facilities; and Ensure that medical personnel are 
aware of the material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves and 
prevent spread of contamination (U.S. Department of Transportation 2004, p. 83)." 
This priority of medical treatment for radiological victims over decontamination is 
well defined in guidelines at the international, national and state levels. Training and 
cooperation at the local level for emergency responders will be a key. element of 
developing a regional response protocol that properly addresses contaminated 
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patient issues. Adhering to this set of guidelines is yet another responsibility local 
law enforcement will have to take on post attack. 
CONTAINMENT OF EXPOSED PERSONS. During the aftermath of a dirty 
bomb attack, collection centers will have to be established to house exposure 
victims. This presents another challenge for law enforcement personnel. They will 
have to function as site security for these centers. That will require stretching 
already thin resources. 
The containment centers will most likely be schools or other larger buildings 
that have been pre-established by emergency planners. Law enforcement will have 
to coordinate with fire and EMS personnel to make sure emergency response plans 
are followed. Law enforcement's will be responsible for the following: 
• Site security; controlling access to the facility and not allowing victims to leave. 
• Logistics; making sure the needed supplies can get access to the facility. 
• Traffic; making sure routes are open so victims can be brought to the facility. 
• Crowd control; ensuring victims or others don't overrun or overflow the facility. 
• Self monitoring; making sure they have proper equipment on site so they don't 
become victims as well. 
TRANSPORTATION 
Transportation is another task of law enforcement when responding to an 
attack. This can be broken down into two categories: transport of officers to and 
from the scene and medical evacuations. If an incident involves a large number of 
victims, transportation routes must be established to move the victims to medical 
facilities. Traffic control must be established as early in the incident as possible. 
Staging areas should be established to prevent the scene from getting congested 
with vehicles. Once control of the transportation is lost it can be very difficult to get 
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back. 
Law Enforcement Transportation. The most immediate way to respond to a 
dirty bomb is by the use of police vehicles. Depending on the locality that is attacked 
there could be anywhere from ten to five hundred vehicles flooding an area in a very 
short period of time. Supervisors must be aware of this and make plans for staging 
areas and traffic control points prior to an attack. Initial responding officers must be 
cognizant of a defensive posture and ensure they are not in a downwind hazard. 
Proper placement of the ICP is crucial. The ICP must be placed uphill, upwind or 
upstream to avoid the hazard. The ICP and staging areas must also be able to move 
to adapt to the situation. For police officers their vehicle is a mobile storage unit and 
office. All of their PPE and other needed supplies will be attached to their vehicle, 
making it a primary need of first responding officers. 
Medical Evacuation. During a dirty bomb attack, the number of victims could 
vary greatly depending on the size of the device used. Like many incidents involving 
WMD, there may be far more victims than first responders. This includes ambulances 
to evacuate the wounded out of the containment zone or from triage centers to 
hospitals. Because of this, it is very likely that law enforcement vehicles will be used 
to transport the victims. This is not unheard of for law enforcement and many 
agencies already train to evacuate down officers. 
When tasked with transporting victims of a radiological incident, police officers 
should already have training on precautions. In almost all cases, the immediate 
transport of patients, whether contaminated or not, will not be delayed for 
decontamination actions provided that there is not a chemical component to the 
contamination. (Chemically contaminated patients will be decontaminated prior to 
treatment or transportation. Unlike radiation contamination, chemical contamination 
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does potentially pose a primary hazard of cross-contamination to medical care 
providers) (Bush berg et al. 2008). After using police vehicles for transportation, 
exposed victims and equipment, the victims will need to be surveyed for radiological 
contamination/exposure levels prior to being released from duty or reassigned. 
Law enforcement will also assist in working within the framework of 
community planning that should have been in place prior to the attack. This allows 
for the use of buses or trucks to transport the victims in addition to medical vehicles. 
This will decrease or eliminate the need to use police vehicles for victim 
transportation purposes. 
DECONTAMINATION 
Although not a function of law enforcement, decontamination is yet another 
issue they will have to deal with at an attack scene. Many officers may have been 
exposed to radiation and not even know it. Many will continue to carry on with their 
duties unaware. Officers should be trained in decontamination techniques so they are 
familiar with what will occur after an exposure to radiation. 
Decontamination procedures will depend on the type, size and scope of the 
attack. Incident specific considerations may include, but are not limited to, weather 
conditions, ambient temperature, additional hazardous materials/hazards associated 
with the incident, the logistical concerns of decontaminating large volumes of people 
in an expedient manner, and the geographic magnitude of the area of involvement. 
According to the US Department of Energy (MERTT 2006), the following 
functions may be required of law enforcement officers while assisting fire and 
medical personnel during the initial response phase to the disaster: 
• Provide First Aid. 
• Remove clothing if appropriate. 
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• Wrap patient in a blanket to minimize contamination. 
• Only expose areas required to assess and treat patient. 
• If necessary, cut and remove the patients clothing away from the body being 
careful to avoid contamination to the unexposed skin. 
• Properly contain all removed clothing by placing it in a sealable bag. 
• Continue to reassess and monitor vitals while in route to a medical facility. 
• Contact with the patient may result in transfer of contamination, so change 
gloves as necessary. 
TACTICAL OPERATIONS 
Although often not thought of, tactical operations may be critical during an 
incident. For example, a suspect may be hiding with another device ready to 
detonate. Depending upon the situation, a tactical operation might have to be 
undertaken inside the restricted zone. Many tactical or SWAT teams train for and 
have the needed equipment of this type of operation. 
For a tactical operation to take place, teams will already be working at a 
disadvantage. They will be wearing cumbersome PPE that will interfere with the 
weapons and tactics often used. Therefore, emphasis should be placed on securing 
the premises as quickly as possible and removing any subjects immediately. Tactical 
operations inside the restricted should include a detailed briefing of things to be on 
the lookout for and things not to do. Teams should be looking for booby traps; and 
should be advised to avoid touching switches or opening unnecessary doors. They 
should be precluded from using items that produce sparks or flames. They should go 
around containers and not move those (Drielak & Brandon 2000). 
Specialized equipment will have to be utilized during an operation in a 
restricted zone. Some of these items include: fire extinguishers, first-aid kits, less 
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lethal weapons, dosimeters, explosion-proof lights, disposable clothing, thermal 
imaging devices, video cameras, video equipped robots, fans, special vehicles, 
medical antidotes, and "safe" radios (Drielak & Brandon 2000). 
TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Today there are more training and equipment options available to law 
enforcement for a response to a radiological attack than ever before. Training is 
offered by both federal and state governments in addition to local "in-house" 
training. The main sources of training for a response to a dirty bomb attack are 
through the network of schools and courses delivered by the federal government. 
The best and most complete training is offered by the Department of Homeland 
Security. The Training Exercise Integration Office within the Department of 
Homeland Security manages a consortium of "Training Partners" to provide ten 
categories of responders, with the best and most up-to-date training available. The 
"Training Partners" include the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP); the 
National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT), Louisiana State 
University (LSU); the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center 
(NERRTC), Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX); the Energetic Materials 
Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), New Mexico Tech Institute of Mining and 
Technology (NMIMT); and the National Center for Exercise Excellence (NCEE), 
Nevada Test Site (NTS), University of Hawaii, National Disaster Preparedness 
Training Center, and Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), and the National 
Center for Emergency Response to Surface Transportation. These seven members 
constitute the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC). 
Additional training in this initiative is provided by: Community Research 
Associates (CRA); US Army Dugway Proving Ground (DPG); the International 
43 
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF); the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS); the 
National Sheriff's Association (NSA); General Physics Corporation (GP) at Pine Bluff 
Arsenal (PBA); Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC); George 
Washington University (GWU); Michigan State University (MSU); National Terrorism 
Preparedness Institute (NTPI); International Association of Campus Law Enforcement 
Administrators (IACLEA); and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
(DHS 2008). 
These "Trading Partners" offer different levels of training to law enforcement 
officers based on the specific job function the officer performs. For example, the 
Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) offers hands-on specialized training to state 
and local emergency responders in the management and remediation of radiological 
and other WMD incidents. Located at the former home of the U.S. Army Chemical 
School at Fort McClellan, Alabama, the CDP conducts live chemical agent training for 
the nation's civilian emergency response community. The training emergency 
responders receive at the CDP provides a valid method for ensuring high levels of 
confidence in equipment, procedures, and individual capabilities (DHS 2008). 
The Louisiana State University Academy of Terrorist Education (the National 
Center for Biomedical Research and Training) provides training to local law 
enforcement agencies and focuses its efforts on the delivery of the Emergency 
Response to Terrorism: Basic Concepts for Law Enforcement Course, and the 
development and delivery of the Emergency Response to Domestic Biological 
Incidents Course (DHS 2008). 
The Texas A&M (National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center) 
delivers a set of courses to prepare state and local officials for the threat posed by 
weapons of mass destruction. Courses are developed and designed to provide each 
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specific segment of the emergency response community with the tools needed to 
accomplish its role in the event of a WMD incident. Additionally, Texas A&M has 
developed an Interactive Internet WMD Awareness Course for emergency 
responders. Texas A&M also provides technical assistance to state and local 
jurisdictions in the development of WMD assessment plans (OHS 2008). 
The U.S. Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site (National Exercise Test 
and Training Center) conducts large scale field exercises using a wide range of live 
agent stimulants as well as explosives. NTS develops and delivers a 
Radiological/Nuclear Agents Course (OHS 2008). 
Of all of these, The National Center for Biomedical Research and Training at 
Louisiana State University offers the most complete courses for basic law 
enforcement needs. The other partners offer excellent training for law enforcement 
officers and can go beyond the basic needs of the front-line officer responding to a 
WMD attack. The programs offered by this center provide an effective way to train 
local law enforcement with the most up-to-date training on responding to WMD 
incidents. The center offers a variety of programs that cater to local law 
enforcement in jurisdictions of all sizes. The programs are offered at different levels 
and are all geared to the front line responders. Courses offered include: Law 
Enforcement Prevention and Deterrence of Terrorist Acts, Emergency Response to 
Domestic Biological Incidents, Weapons of Mass Destruction Tactical Operations, 
Public Safety WMD Response - Sampling Techniques and Guidelines, Operational 
WMD Response for Law Enforcement, Weapons of Mass Destruction Advanced 
Tactical Operations, Utilizing Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations, 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Tactical Commanders and Preparedness and Response 
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to Agricultural Terrorism, and Integrated Response to Incidents of WMD (NCBRT 
2008). 
EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR A DIRTY BOMB ATTACK 
Protection levels are mandated in CF 29-1910-120 which are federal and 
OSHA statutes. CFR 40 EPA provides similar mandates. Additionally, The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) offer numerous recommendations for 
equipment based on the type of threat environment that is encountered. They direct 
that use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) be based on a level system. The 
levels are A to C. 
Level A is the highest level for using the maximum amount of PPE to include 
fully encapsulating non-permeable splash protective suits and self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA). This is geared to hazardous materials teams and would 
not likely be used by law enforcement. However, if law enforcement personnel are 
trained as HAZMAT Techs it would benefit the community as means of early 
detection and reporting in case of an attack. 
Level B (the minimal level of protection for entering an environment of an 
unknown hazard) puts the first responder in protective clothing designed to provide 
protection against liquid and aerosolized chemicals and use of an SCBA. 
Level C requires protective clothing and the use of an air-purifying respirator 
(APR), more commonly known as a protective mask. Law enforcement currently 
operates on the basis of Level C protection. The protective equipment is made up of 
a Tyvek suit (a chemical protective coverall) and a gas mask with different filters to 
provide protection against different types of chemical and biological agents (29 CFR 
1910-120 1997). 
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Research suggests that the standard for law enforcement today is Level C 
protective equipment. Level C provides a recognized level of protection for the 
contamination reduction zone where law enforcement may be stationed. Level C PPE 
consists of a full-face respirator, chemical protective clothing, chemical protective 
gloves and foot covers. It is also important that the responder know the limitations 
of the protective suit. This make up of protective equipment and should provide all 
the protection the first responding police officer should need (US Army Solider 
Biological and Chemical Command 2003). 
Communication is another area in which equipment needs were reviewed. 
Research found that local law enforcement must have the ability to communicate 
with each other through radio channels and have plans for a unified command post. 
For example, during the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, the Arlington Police 
Department's pager system did not work efficiently with many pages not getting to 
essential personnel (Arlington County AAR 2004). A true and tested communication 
system is a necessity. Having extra radios, fax machines, and computers will aid in 
the response. 
Vehicles were found to be the last type of equipment that was needed in a 
response to WMD attack. Law enforcement must have the necessary type and 
number of vehicles for response or, at a minimum, have access to them. The types 
of vehicles needed should include buses, four wheel drive vehicles, ATV's, tactical 
team vehicles, and prisoner transport vehicles. In addition, command and control 
vehicles allow for consolidation of a command post. Plans should be in place to 
decide where to assemble, store, acquire and locate needed transportation for law 
enforcement (IACP Project Response 2006). 
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ADDITIONAL RESPONDING AGENCIES 
State Assistance. Local law enforcement will not go it alone during a 
disaster of this magnitude. Federal agencies will play a key support function for tasks 
extending beyond the abilities of local law enforcement. State resources will also 
come to bear in the response and recovery operations. State departments of health, 
emergency management, state police, emergency medical services and civil support 
teams will all play important roles. 
Primarily, state police agencies will assist local law enforcement with traffic 
control, scene security, and command and control issues. Many states also have 
HAZMAT teams stationed at various locations within the state. In many cases they 
may become first responders. State departments of health and medical services will 
also be called upon to respond and assist during an attack. Hospitals and other state 
maintained health organizations will be prominent during the incident. Because each 
state varies in how it responds to an attack, only general assumptions can be made 
about response without detailing each individual state's plans and organization. 
Federal Assistance. Local law enforcement will need to coordinate with 
numerous federal agencies during the initial phase of a dirty bomb attack. Officers on 
the scene should have some idea of who those agencies are and what functions they 
perform because many of the responding federal agencies will be unknown to front 
line officers. 
Department of Energy (DOE). Most of these agencies will be from the 
Department of Energy (DOE), under the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA). 
Possible responding agencies from DOE and NNSA are: 
• Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) 
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• Accident Response Group (ARG) 
• Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) 
• Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) 
• Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) 
• Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) 
RAP, with areas of expertise including assessment, area monitoring, air 
sampling, exposure and contamination control is usually the first NNSA responder for 
assessing the emergency situation (DOE 2005). 
Department of Homeland Security (OHS). According to NRF NUC 1, the 
OHS is responsible for the overall coordination of all actual and potential types of 
incidents of national significance, including most terrorist incidents involving nuclear 
materials. The National Response Framework (2008) (formerly the National 
Response Plan [2002]) under the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NUC-1) lists 
different types of incidents and which corresponding federal agency would be 
responsible for coordinating the response: 
• Terrorism - DOD or DOE if occurrence happens on their facility or material 
under their control; NRC if material is licensed by the NRC or a contract with 
the state. 
• For all other terrorism, OHS is the coordinating agency. 
• Nuclear Facilities - DOE or DOD if it is their facility; NRC if licensed or 
agreement with state; unlicensed or not owned by a federal agency, the EPA 
becomes the coordinating agency. 
•Transportation - DOD or DOE for their material; NRC for their material; 
OHS/USCG for materials in coastal zones for materials not licensed or owned by 
a Federal agency; all others are under the coordination of the EPA. 
• Space Vehicles - NASA or DOD; OHS/USCG if not managed by DOD or 
NASA; all others, are the responsibility of the EPA. 
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• Weapon accident - depending on custody at the time of incident is either the 
DOD or DOE. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI is the primary agency for 
the federal government in regard to law enforcement response. FBI agents from local 
field offices will be among the first federal representatives to arrive and in some 
cases, may act as first responders. The FBI has a Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
{HMRU) which has sampling, detection, and identification capabilities that can be 
used. They have the ability to collect forensic evidence at a radiological crime scene. 
They also maintain Evidence Response Teams {ERT) that will be dispatched to assist 
in the investigation. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA will be the lead 
agency for DHS during a radiological response. FEMA is responsible for coordinating 
supplemental federal resources, including the Urban Search and Rescue Teams 
{USAR). These teams will be able to aid in the location and recovery of victims if the 
attack involved destruction to structures. In addition, FEMA would likely solicit 
assistance from the other agencies listed below. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS can provide 
health and medical expertise so needed after a dirty bomb attack. DHHS has 
Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams {MMST) positioned around the country to respond 
quickly if an attack takes place. They can assist with agent identification and 
detection, decontamination of patients, triage, and medical treatment. The CDC is a 
component of DHHS. The CDC can provide technical consultation and can provide 
response support for state and local health agencies. 
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Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD does not just coordinate activities 
of America's armed forces, it also supports civil authorities in recovering from 
multiple, catastrophic WMD attacks that occur within our borders (DOD, 2005). 
In order to better support operations within the United States, the DOD created 
National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) in 1998. Although listed under the DOD, 
CSTs are considered state assets under control of the governor. The mission of the 
CSTs is to deploy rapidly and support local agencies during a WMD incident. A CST 
will assist in determining the nature and extent of an attack and provide technical 
knowledge and assistance (GlobalSecurity.org 2008). CSTs' are of valuable 
assistance to civil authorities in the event of an incident involving weapons of mass 
destruction in the United States (GlobalSecurity.org 2008). These teams provide a 
bridge between federal and local authorities to allow for a better response to a 
radiological incident. Additionally, the DOD will be able to access many of its other 
resources to assist, such as providing medical teams, air/ground transportation, 
scene security, supply delivery, command and control facilities and communication 
equipment. 
Some of the other units available from the DOD are (Drielak & Brandon 2000, p. 73): 
• US Army Technical Escort Unit (TEU): Field sampling, monitoring, recovery, 
rendering safe, and decontamination. 
• US Army Military Research Institute for Infectious Disease (USAMRIID): 
Technical consultation, biological assessment and identification. 
• US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF): Rapid 
response force, agent identification, hazard prediction, decontamination, 
medical treatment, and security. 
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GUIDELINES FOR A FEDERAL RESPONSE 
Over the last two decades the federal government has revamped much of the 
way it plans for and responds to a disaster or terrorist attack. One of the biggest 
changes was the development of the Department of Homeland Security. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for overall coordination of all 
actual and potential "Incidents of National Significance," including terrorist incidents 
involving nuclear material (NRF 2008). This is done in accordance with Presidential 
Directive-5 and is described more fully in the National Response Plan. Federal 
response to any specific incident is based on the local agencies' ability to respond, 
identify the amount of material involved, the extent of the impact to the environment 
on populations and the overall magnitude of the incident (NRF [NUC-2] 2008). 
Local agencies should also understand that federal agencies can respond 
without the request of the state within their own statutory authority. Federal 
agencies will do this in order to assess hazards associated with a radiological event 
and to decrease time lags in the notification process. A National Defense Area (NDA) 
or National Security Area (NSA) can be established by the DOD, DOE or to safeguard 
classified information. The area involved will fall under federal control for reasons of 
national security (NRF [NUC-5] 2008). 
The National Response Framework dictates how federal agencies will respond 
and work during a time of disaster (DHS 2008). NRP establishes protocols to help 
protect the nation from terrorist attacks and other natural and manmade hazards; 
save lives; protect public health, safety, property and the environment; and reduces 
adverse psychological consequences (DHS 2008). All incidents are to be handled at 
the lowest level possible by the jurisdiction having authority. Any incident that rises 
to the "level of national significance," DHS will serve as the operational and/or 
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resource coordinator for federal support to the on-scene incident command (OHS 
2008). 
NIMS and ICS 
The key element in any successful disaster response involves having a set of 
standards and guidelines established before catastrophe strikes. The federal 
template is called the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS "provides 
a nationwide template enabling federal, state, local and tribal governments and 
private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work together effectively and 
efficiently to prevent, prepare for respond to, and recovery from domestic incidents 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity (FEMA 2004, website)." Not only are all 
federal agencies guided by NIMS, but so are state and local jurisdictions. 
On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive/HSPD-5. This is the foundation for three basic plans to 
establish a unified command and control structure, detailed below. 
First, a National Response Framework was established to deal with and protect 
the country from natural or manmade disaster. Next, a National Incident 
Management System was drawn up to train and prepare America's first responders 
and others for disaster response. Finally, under NIMS an Incident Control System 
(ICS) was structured as an on-scene command and control structure. 
HSPD-5 also called for a timetable for setting up NIMS and getting it in working 
order and out to the states. NIMS provides a set of guidelines for command and 
control that each federal, state and local agency must follow. Employees of these 
organizations are given classes on NIMS and are required to demonstrate knowledge 
of the system. In many cases police officers and firefighters are given pocket guides 
to illustrate how NIMS is structured. Additionally, federal funds for state and local 
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agencies are now tied to NIMS compliance. 
Each agency, whether it is federal, state or local has to operate uniformly when 
a disaster strikes. With that in mind, the federal government set out to establish a 
new set of standards everyone can follow. This did not apply to just government 
organizations, it applied to private industry and non-governmental organizations as 
well. 
Other government agencies and private organizations have adopted the use of 
an Incident Command System (ICS). These organizations have recognized that the 
concept works and compliance with those protocols can only benefit them. Although 
they are under no mandate to create an ICS plan, most have set up guidelines or 
standards within their organizations that mimic the standards set forth in NIMS. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A dirty bomb attack will most likely be an attack of terrorism. This could include 
the use of a radiological dispersal device, a radiation proximity device or a release of 
radiation from an established facility. A dirty bomb will arguably exceed the 
capabilities of local law enforcement's ability to adequately handle the incident. The 
local police will focus on isolating the area, identifying the hazards associated with 
the emergency, scene security, traffic control, assisting with transporting the 
seriously injured, and reporting their needs for state and federal resources support. 
Law enforcement will assume a variety of roles during a dirty bomb attack. 
They are not just going to be first responders in the traditional sense. The presence 
of law enforcement will be required for the duration of the incident. Although many 
of the tasks they are responsible for are typical police functions, many others are 
going to be outside the normal functions performed on a daily basis. 
A plan must be in place before an attack occurs. Pre-planning and prior 
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coordination of local, state and federal resources to mitigate the incident should be 
addressed in a radiation response protocol. The coordination of initial response 
through recovery of affected infrastructure and population centers can help to ensure 
the most effective use of resources and enhance the efficiency of emergency 
operations. 
A regional radiation response plan will ensure an effective response plan 
including, triage, treatment, decontamination, transportation of victims, and 
collaboration with regional, state and federal agencies in a fiscally responsible 
manner. The improved treatment and transportation of contaminated patients will 
improve the survival profiles of victims and reduce the likelihood of agencies being 
held liable for failure to respond, protect emergency personnel, and treat victims in 
the aftermath of a radiation event to a level that meets recognized industry 
standards. 
Proper protective equipment is a must if officers are going to survive an attack 
and then continue to perform in its aftermath. Law enforcement will need to be 
provided with dosimeters to alert them of high radiation concentrations. This 
equipment will need to account for both the long-term dose monitoring while working 
in the contaminated environment and warning personnel when predetermined 
thresholds of exposure have been exceeded. Again, ensuring officers are equipped 
with PPE should be a top priority for any law enforcement agency. The level of PPE 
needed will vary depending on the assignment of each officer. Agencies should 
maintain a variety of this equipment. At a minimum, the purchase of a small number 
of detection/dosimeter devices should be required to equip frontline personnel. 
The equipment should be readily available to be deployed to responding 
personnel during the initial stages of an incident. This should be a key element in the 
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any response protocol for local law enforcement. The deployment of the proper 
equipment may be realigned amongst personnel having the greatest risk of exposure 
to radiation during the incident. Those at risk of greatest exposure can be defined as 
personnel having response responsibilities in the exclusion zones, including resources 
such as HAZMAT response teams, decontamination personnel, medical response 
resources, or tactical elements of law enforcement. Protective equipment may also 
be distributed to support zone personnel such as perimeter security, transportation 
assets and command staff. 
In the event of an attack, the incident commander (in concert with his safety 
officer) will determine the appropriate level of PPE in the hazardous environment. For 
law enforcement that recommendation will most likely be that a Level C suit (a 
protective suit, gloves, boots and a gas mask) be worn. For officers conducting 
tactical operations, a Level B or even a Level A suit may be required. In the future 
law enforcement agencies should look toward SCBA gear and lighter, more user-
friendly protective suits. This will allow for easier storage of equipment in agency 
vehicles. Mainly, it will allow officers operating in the area to be comfortable while 
performing tasks. 
Communication will play a vital role in the response effort. Agencies must 
have systems that can work together or have plans for a unified command center 
where information can be exchanged, redundancy of resources minimized, and plans 
put into action. Radio communication is the primary means of communication. Every 
officer should be equipped with a portable radio. Additionally, all officers should have 
a "card" with them that shows which channels on the radio are to be used and what 
assignment each radio channel maintains. Portable communication towers and relay 
equipment should be brought to the scene in case the device knocked out power or a 
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pre-existing communications tower is in the area. If possible officers should be 
assigned cellular phones as a back-up form of communication. Radio systems in 
place must also be able to be "patched" with other responding agencies. This will 
allow all officers working the field to communicate, no matter what police agency 
they work for. 
Vehicles are another consideration for law enforcement. Each agency should 
have a pool of vehicles available for use during a dirty bomb attack or at least have 
locations or plans to obtain the necessary transportation. Buses, mobile command 
centers and all-terrain vehicles will be among the most needed during an incident. 
Vehicle staging areas should be set up to reduce traffic and prevent the congestion 
of the roadways near the incident. Ideally officers will have needed PPE and other 
equipment in their vehicle with them before an incident occurs. 
Training of law enforcement personnel prior to an incident is a must. Even if 
the best equipment available, it will do no good if officers are not trained how to use 
it. Radiation awareness and operational levels of training combined with the study of 
policies related to responding to a radiation emergency will be required. Training 
must also address the element of fear. The knowledge of radiation and 
understanding the response protocol will go a long way to reducing that fear in 
responding officers. The utilization of recognized national training programs 
facilitated by federal agencies in radiation response will ensure consistency of 
information across response disciplines and between localities. 
Training sites are located throughout the country which offer the best and most 
comprehensive training available today. The Training/Exercise Integration Office for 
the Department of Homeland Security provides a consortium of "Trading Partners" 
working together to provide training to local law enforcement on all WMD issues. 
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These different programs, federal training centers and many connected with major, 
well respected universities, offer flexible training programs both at their facilities and 
in local jurisdictions. Local departments should be made aware of these programs 
and routinely send officers to these different types of training. Although it may not 
be possible to send every officer in a department it would be wise to at least send 
frontline supervisors. Upon return to their respective agencies, they can pass along 
the knowledge gained to other personnel. 
The role of the law enforcement officer during a dirty bomb attack is not easily 
defined. There are so many unknowns about the type of devastation that will be 
caused depending on the size and location of the attack. There is no prior attack to 
analyze and use as a baseline for comparison. Based on the research conducted, 
officers will perform the following tasks in response to an ROD attack: 
• Site security 
• Traffic control (controlling access to and from scene, keeping roads clear) 
• Tactical operations 
• Command and Control (in concert with other responding agencies) 
• Transportation 
• First Aid/assist with triage 
• Security at support sites 
• Crime scene preservation 
• Investigative assistance (FBI will assume primary role) 
• Perform normal police functions in unaffected areas 
• Create and maintain staging areas 
• Report needs and situation to command center 
During an attack a police officer will have to wear many hats but the primary goal of 
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the individual police officer will be to preserve life. 
Local law enforcement agencies should plan for the future. Principles learned 
and followed for a response to a radiation attack will be able to be used in response 
to other types of WMD incidents. Agencies must not become complacent because an 
attack has never taken place. The time and place of an attack cannot be predicted. A 
strike could occur in rural America, at a nuclear power plant, or in a major city using 
a dispersion device. All agencies in the country should routinely send personnel to 
training courses related to an ROD attack. All officers within in agency should have at 
least a basic knowledge of what an ROD attack is and the response protocols. Often 
not thought of is supplying officers with dosimeters or radiological detection devices. 
Since frontline officers will be the first to respond, it would only make sense they 
have this capability. Agencies should plan to have access to the variety of vehicles 
that will be needed. Local law enforcement agencies must take the initiative and plan 
now how to respond to an RDD attack and not be caught unprepared in the event an 
attack does take place in their community. 
Law enforcement agencies and officers will undoubtedly be pushed to the 
extreme if a dirty bomb attack takes place in their jurisdiction. No one agency can 
be solely responsible for the mitigation, planning, response and recovery from such a 
devastating type of attack. Planning, training and equipping those front-line men and 
women will be critical to achieving a successful outcome. Certainly law enforcement 
officers dread the day when they might have to put that training to the test. But 
when that day comes, officers should be confident that they have the knowledge, 
skills, plan, training and equipment needed to respond and work in such a horrible 
and unforgiving environment. 
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DEFINITIONS 
• Electromagnetic radiation: Defined by the modular emergency response 
radiological transportation training program (MERRTT) as visible light, heat, 
radio waves, and microwaves which are low level radiation energy which is 
referred to as non-ionizing radiation. 
• High-energy radiation is referred to as ionizing radiation. Ionizing radiation is 
of sufficient energy to eject an electron from an atom, thereby changing the 
electron configuration of the atom and thus its chemical properties. This Is the 
initiating event that can ultimately lead to biological damage and the potential 
adverse health consequences of ionizing radiation. 
• Radiation physical half-life (Tpl/2): The time required for a quantity of a 
radionuclide to decay (i.e., transform) by one-half. Some radionuclides have a 
Tpl/2 of a few hours (e.g. Tc-99m used widely in Nuclear Medicine- Tpl/2=6 
hrs), or many years (e.g. Cs-137 used in instrument calibration facilities 
Tpl/2-30 yrs and U-238 found in nature Tpl/2= 4.5 billion years (FEMA 
2002). 
• Radioactive material: Any material that spontaneously emits ionizing radiation 
(GSA 1978). 
• Radioactive contamination: Radioactive material where it is not intended (FEMA 
1990). 
• ALARA: Acronym for "as low as (is) reasonably achievable." Means making 
every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to ionizing radiation as far 
below the dose limits as practical, taking into account the state of technology, 
the cost of incremental reductions in dose, and other societal and 
socioeconomic considerations, regarding the utilization of radioactive material 
in the public interest (FEMA 1990). 
• Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE): The sum of the internal and external 
doses of radiation exposure (FEMA 1990). 
• Inverse Square Law: The relationship that states that electromagnetic radiation 
intensity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance from a point 
source. Thus reducing the distance from a radiation source by 1/2 increases 
the exposure rate four times. The same law works in reverse, whereby 
increasing the distance from a radiation source by a factor of 2 reduces the 
exposure rate four fold (FEMA 1990). 
• Fissile Material: Any material in which neutrons can cause a fission reaction. 
The three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and 
plutonium-239 (FEMA 1990) .. 
• Low Specific Activity (LSA): Radioactive material with limited amounts of 
radioactivity relative to the amount of the material. An example would be 
uranium or thorium ores, mill tailings or contaminated earth (FEMA 1990). 
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• Special form radioactive material: Can be either a single, solid piece of 
material, or a sealed capsule that can be opened only by destroying the 
capsule. Special form material is considered to be non-dispersible during 
accident conditions. Special form material should not be confused with 
''Special Nuclear Material" which is plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium 
enriched in isotopes uranium-233 or urnium-235 (NRP2004). 
• Surface contaminated objects: Solid object that is not radioactive in of itself, 
but has radioactive contamination on its surface (NRP 2004). 
APPENDIX 
AAR - After Action Report 
APR - Air Purifying Respirator 
ATV - All Terrain Vehicle 
CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
CBIRF - US Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force 
CDC - Centers for Disease Control 
CDC - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CDP - Center for Domestic Preparedness 
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency 
ONDO - Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DGP - Dugway Proving Ground 
EMS - Emergency Medical Services 
EOC - Emergency Operations Center 
EOP - Emergency Operations Plan 
ERT - Evidence Response Team 
ESU - Emergency Services Unit 
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency 
mR - Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy 
GRPI - Greater Richmond Partnership Incorporated 
GP - General Physics Corporation 
GWU - George Washington University 
HAZMAT - Hazardous Materials 
HMRU - Hazardous Materials Response unit 
HSPD-5 - Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
HSPD-8 - Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 
IACLEA - International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators 
IACP - International Association of Chiefs of Police 
ICS - Incident Command System 
IED - Improvised Explosive Device 
MAC - Multi-Agency Coordination 
NCBRT - National Center for Biomedical Research and Training 
NCEE - National Center for Exercise Excellence 
NDPC - National Domestic Preparedness Consortium 
NIOSH - National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NMIMT - New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology 
NIMS - National Incident Management System 
NRF - National Response Framework 
NPR - National Response Plan 
NSA - National Sheriffs Association 
NTPI - National Terrorism Preparedness Institute 
NTS - Nevada Test Site 
NYPD - New York City Police Department 
OCP - Office of Commonwealth Preparedness 
OEM - Office of Emergency Management 
OPGW - Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PAPD - Port Authority Police Department 
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PBA - Pine Bluff Arsenal 
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment 
RDD - Radiological Dispersion Device 
RUCS - Regional Unified Command Structure 
RRT - Regional Response Teams 
SAIC - Science Application International Corporation 
SCBA - Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 
TEEX - Texas Engineering Extension Service 
TEU- US Army Technical Escort Unit 
USAMRID - US Army Military Research Institute for Infectious Disease 
USAR - Urban Search and Rescue 
VDACS - Virginia Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services 
VDEM - Virginia Department of Emergency Management 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
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